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Abstract
We address three related questions concerning financial liberalization in a small
open economy. Does financial liberalization and the resulting capital inflow improve
production efficiency in the domestic economy? Who benefits from financial liber-
alization in the long run and in the short run? Should financial liberalization be
implemented gradually or hastily?
Our main results are as follows. First, whether financial deregulation in one
sector can improve production efficiency may depend on financial regulation in other
sectors. Second, financial liberalization may have opposite welfare implications
to domestic agents with different productivity in the long run. Third, although
some domestic agents lose in the long run, they actually benefit from financial
liberalization during the transitional process of deregulation. Finally, a gradual
implementation helps achieve a smooth transition.
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1 Introduction
According to neoclassical models, financial liberalization has significant economic benefits.
International capital flows provide developing economies with the means to exploit promis-
ing investment opportunities; at the same time, international investors are able to earn
higher returns and to reduce risk via international portfolio diversification (Stulz, 2005).
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001, 2003) investigate the dynamic interactions between
domestic and international collateral constraints and show that limited financial devel-
opment reduces the incentives for foreign lenders to enter emerging markets. Iacoviello
and Minetti (forthcoming) assume that foreign lenders differ from domestic lenders in
their ability to recover value from borrowers’ assets and, therefore, to protect themselves
against contractual non-enforceability. They show that such a model helps explain the
comovement of output across countries. Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2005) analyze the
medium-run adjustment process after capital account liberalization and show that pro-
duction efficiency depends on the degree of capital account liberalization. Alessandria and
Qian (2005) examine the impact of foreign borrowing on both welfare and the structure
of lending contracts. The entry of foreign investors to the domestic financial market may
improve or worsen the efficiency of financial intermediaries, leading to an improvement or
worsening of the aggregate composition of investment projects.
During the past two decades, many countries have deregulated financial markets and
reduced explicit barriers to foreign investors. As a result, global capital flows have achieved
record highs relative to global income. However, financial liberalization might have un-
equal welfare implications to different domestic agents. Furthermore, the policy sequenc-
ing and implementation strategy are of great importance for the success of financial lib-
eralization. Recent experience with financial crises clearly suggests that mistakes in the
policy implementation can contribute to severe macroeconomic consequences, e.g., sudden
stops (WorldBank, 2005).
We address three related questions concerning financial liberalization in a small open
economy, given that the foreign interest rate is lower than the domestic interest rate. Does
financial liberalization and the resulting capital inflow improve production efficiency in
the domestic economy? Who benefits from financial liberalization in the long run and in
the short run? Should financial liberalization be implemented gradually or hastily?
Our main results are as follows. First, whether financial deregulation in one sector can
improve production efficiency may depend on financial regulation in other sectors. Second,
financial liberalization may have opposite welfare implications to domestic agents with
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different productivity level in the long run. This explains why financial liberalization
receives support and opposition from different domestic interest groups. Third, although
some domestic agents lose in the long run, they actually benefit from financial liberal-
ization in the short run, i.e., during the transitional process of deregulation. Finally, a
gradual implementation helps achieve a smooth transition of financial liberalization.
Our results can be explained intuitively as follows. Consider a small open economy
with two types of private agents: households and entrepreneurs. Both have production
projects using a durable physical asset, “land”, as input. The project that entrepreneurs
choose in equilibrium is expected to be more productive than the households’ project. As
households are risk averse and the entrepreneurs’ projects are subject to idiosyncratic risk,
mutual funds emerge as financial intermediaries. They collect deposits from households
and lend to entrepreneurs. If entrepreneurs could credibly pledge all of their project
outcomes for external funds, land would be all allocated to entrepreneurs. However, due
to financial frictions, land is not fully allocated to entrepreneurs and some of the land
stock is allocated to households. Given that land has a fixed total supply, production
efficiency in the domestic economy can be measured by the fraction of the entrepreneurs’
land holding in the total land stock. There are three types of domestic assets: a physical
asset (land) and two financial assets: household deposit at the mutual funds and mutual
fund loans to entrepreneurs.
A continuum of foreign lenders who are risk neutral supply funds at a constant interest
rate lower than the domestic interest rate. Due to limited enforcement problems, domestic
agents must pledge domestic assets for foreign funds. We assume, for simplicity, that a
domestic financial regulator has full power in determining the fraction of domestic assets
pledgable for foreign funds. Financial liberalization is modeled as the process during
which the financial regulator raises such fractions and, thus domestic agents can borrow
more abroad.
Our first result says that whether or not deregulating land-backed foreign borrowing
can improve production efficiency depends on the financial regulation of deposit-back
foreign borrowing. Our second result says that due to the substitution of cheap foreign
loans for domestic loans, domestic agents with low productivity (households) lose strictly
while domestic agents with high productivity (entrepreneurs) may benefit from financial
liberalization in the long run. Consider first the case of deregulating deposit-backed foreign
borrowing, keeping the regulation of land-backed foreign borrowing constant. Households
are allowed to borrow abroad against a larger fraction of their deposits. According to
the no-arbitrage condition, the interest rate differential between domestic and foreign
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loans becomes smaller. Although entrepreneurs cannot increase their land-backed foreign
borrowing much, they can acquire cheaper domestic loans and more land is allocated
to their projects in the long run. As the wealth and the welfare of entrepreneurs are
proportional to their land holding, they benefit strictly. Deregulating deposit-backed
foreign borrowing leads to the substitution of cheap foreign funds for the households’ net
deposits. In addition, the unfavorable land reallocation and the resulting decline in their
sales revenues have a negative effect on household wealth. Households have to reduce
consumption and increase labor supply, i.e., households lose strictly in the long run.
Therefore, deregulating deposit-backed foreign borrowing improves production efficiency
and has opposite long-run welfare implications to households and entrepreneurs. These
results do not depend on the regulation of land-backed foreign borrowing.
Things become more complicated in the case of deregulating land-backed foreign bor-
rowing. If deposit-backed foreign borrowing is highly regulated, there is a large interest
rate differential between domestic loans and foreign loans. Deregulating land-backed for-
eign borrowing allows domestic agents to acquire more foreign funds against their land
holding. Although households can also borrow more abroad, the average cost of exter-
nal funds of entrepreneurs declines more than that of households and, thus more land is
allocated to the entrepreneurs’ projects. In this case, deregulating land-backed foreign
borrowing has similar efficiency and welfare implications as in the case of deregulating
deposit-backed foreign borrowing mentioned above.
If deposit-backed foreign borrowing is already highly deregulated, the domestic interest
rate is very close to the foreign rate. Deregulating land-backed foreign borrowing does
not reduce the average cost of entrepreneurs’ external funds very much, while the cost of
households’ external funds declines significantly. As a result, more land is allocated into
the households’ project and production becomes less efficient. Due to the substitution of
foreign loans for domestic loans, the households’ deposits decline and so do their wealth
and welfare. At the same time, the decline in the entrepreneurs’ land stock corresponds to
the decline in their net wealth and their welfare. Thus, deregulating land-backed foreign
borrowing may not necessarily improve production efficiency and may have negative long-
run welfare implications to both households and entrepreneurs. These results depend on
the regulation of deposit-backed foreign borrowing.
Our third result says that although households lose strictly in the long run, they
indeed benefit in the short run. Intuitively, as some of the households’ net deposits are
eventually crowded out by cheap foreign funds, households consume these funds during
the transitional process and their short-run welfare increases.
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Our fourth result says that due to financial frictions, the land price overshoots in the
short run and the resulting macroeconomic fluctuations are large, if financial liberalization
is implemented hastily. Intuitively, the announcement of financial deregulation induces
domestic agents to increase their land holding immediately, because they anticipate a
higher land price in the future. The rise in the land price improves entrepreneurial net
worth contemporaneously. If the financial regulator implements the deregulation pol-
icy hastily, the inflow of cheap foreign funds into the domestic credit market increases
immediately and the domestic interest rate declines dramatically. The improvement in
entrepreneurial net worth and the decline in the domestic interest rate jointly amplify the
land investment of entrepreneurs. Thus, the land price overshoots in the sense that its im-
mediate response exceeds its new long-run level. In the case of a gradual implementation,
the inflow of cheap foreign funds does not increase very much. The excess investment
demand of entrepreneurs pushes up the domestic interest rate. The rise in the domestic
interest rate indeed curbs the excess land investment of entrepreneurs. Thus, the land
price does not overshoot and the resulting macroeconomic fluctuations are smaller in the
case of a gradual implementation than in the case of a hasty implementation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 discusses the long-run implications of financial liberalization. Section 4 analyzes the
transitional dynamics of financial liberalization. Section 5 summarizes the main findings.
2 The Model
Consider a small, open, real economy. There are three domestic goods: a durable asset
(land) with a fixed total supply, K, an intermediate good, and a final good. There are
two types of domestic private agents with infinite numbers: households and entrepreneurs,
each of unit mass. There is a financial regulator and a continuum of foreign lenders.
Households are risk averse and infinitely lived. In each period, they have a safe back-
yard project to produce intermediate goods using land as the only input; they are endowed
with one unit of labor that can be supplied to the production of final goods. Entrepreneurs
are risk neutral and each has a constant probability of death. In each period, entrepreneurs
of mass (1−pi) exit from the economy and new entrepreneurs of the same mass are born,
keeping the population size of entrepreneurs constant. The newcomers and the surviv-
ing entrepreneurs supply their labor endowment to the production of final goods.1 They
1Each entrepreneur must put a positive amount of own funds in the project in order to acquire loans.
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) adopt the same approach.
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have two available projects for the production of intermediate goods using both land and
final goods as inputs. Both projects are subject to idiosyncratic risk: projects have pos-
itive output in the case of success and there is no output in the case of failure. Each
entrepreneur can choose only one project and his project choice is unobservable to oth-
ers. It takes one period for domestic agents to complete their projects. Land does not
depreciate, while the input of final goods fully depreciates during the project process. In-
termediate goods are country-specific and only used for the domestic production of final
goods. Thus, there is no foreign trade in intermediate goods. Final goods can be either
consumed, or invested, or exported.
The project that entrepreneurs choose in equilibrium is more productive than the
households’ project. Mutual funds accept deposits from households and provide loans to
entrepreneurs. A deposit contract is a claim on the financial position of the mutual funds.
Thus, there are three types of domestic assets: a physical asset (land) and two financial
assets: household deposits at the mutual funds and mutual fund loans to entrepreneurs.
The foreign lenders are risk neutral and supply funds inelastically at a constant rate of r∗.
The financial regulator determines the degree of financial openness, defined in subsection
2.1.
The final good is chosen as the numeraire. Land is traded at the price qt on the spot
market. Let vt, wt, and w
e
t denote the price of the intermediate good, the wage rates of
households and entrepreneurs, respectively. The domestic interest rate rt is the expected
rate of return on the mutual funds. For simplicity, we assume that the foreign interest
rate is always lower than the domestic interest rate around the steady state, r∗ < rt.
2.1 Asset-Backed Foreign Borrowing
The mutual funds have the exclusive technology to perfectly verify the project outcomes
of domestic agents and to liquidate the land stock of failed projects of entrepreneurs at
no discount. As foreign lenders do not have such verification technology, domestic agents
cannot credibly pledge their project output to foreign lenders. However, they can borrow
abroad against their domestic assets. Normally, foreign lenders are less familiar with the
domestic asset market and would incur larger costs in liquidating collateral assets in the
event of debtors’ default than domestic agents. Furthermore, the domestic legal system is
biased against foreign lenders. Either way, foreign borrowing has to be overcollateralized
in the following sense. In period t, each unit of land is expected to have the value of
Etqt+1 in period t + 1 and domestic agents can pledge only a fraction of the land value,
θktEtqt+1, to foreign lenders for
θkt Etqt+1
r∗ units of final goods, where θ
k
t ∈ (0, 1]. (1− θkt ) can
6
be regarded as a premium that foreign lenders would have to pay to the domestic land
buyers when they liquidate the collateralized land.2 θkt can be affected by many factors,
e.g., the efficiency of the domestic legal system, the structure and maturity of domestic
market institutions, the tightness of financial regulations, and etc. Thus, θkt reflects the
degree of foreign lender protection and the effective financial openness.
Similarly, each unit of deposit in period t has an expected return of rt in period t+ 1
and households can pledge only a fraction of the expected deposit return, θdt rt, to foreign
lenders for
θdt rt
r∗ units of final goods, where θ
d
t ∈ (0, 1]. Given that households collectively
own the mutual funds, the deposit-backed foreign borrowing essentially enables them to
pledge part of the value of the superior verification and liquidation technology of the
mutual funds to foreign lenders.
2.1.1 Two Implementation Strategies of Financial Liberalization
In order to analyze the policy implications of financial liberalization, we assume that θjt
are perfectly controlled by the financial regulator and determined at the beginning of
each period, where j ∈ {d, k}. Financial liberalization may occur due to international
or domestic pressures. We focus here on its implications instead of why it occurs. In
comparison with monetary policy, financial liberalization is not a day-to-day business and
for simplicity, we consider it as an unexpected one-time structural change. Be specific, θjt
keeps constant and the domestic economy is in its steady state until the financial regulator
decides to change it once for all. For its long-run implications, we investigate the steady
state patterns of production efficiency and social welfare under various degrees of financial
openness in section 3. For the short-run dynamics, we model financial liberalization as
the process in which the financial regulator raises θj either by the big-bang strategy or
by the gradualism strategy. In the case of the big-bang strategy, it raises θj permanently
in period t and keep θj constant at the new level afterwards. The big-bang strategy can
be modeled as,
log θjt = log θ
j
t−1 + ε
j
t ,
where εjt denotes the one-time policy change in period t. In the case of the gradualism
strategy, it announces a path for θj gradually reaching the new level over time. The
2This premium may vary along the business cycle and so does θkt . See Iacoviello and Minetti (forth-
coming) for a detailed discussion.
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gradualism strategy can be modeled as,
log θjt = logH
j
t − log J jt ,
logHjt = logH
j
t−1 + ε
j
t ,
log J jt = ρ log J
j
t−1 + ε
j
t ,
where ρ determines the speed of θj approaching to the new level. The one-time policy
change εjt does not affect θ
j in period t, but θj grows eventually to the new level. See
Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) for the modeling approach. Figure 1 shows the time path of
θj under the two strategies, given a 1% positive policy shock in period 0. A larger ρ in the
gradualism strategy implies that it takes longer for θj to reach the new level. In section
4, we set ρ = 0.9 and compare the short-run effects of the two strategies.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
The Big−Bang Strategy
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
The Gradualism Strategy
ρ=0.5
ρ=0.9
ρ=0.95
Figure 1: The Policy Paths of The Two Strategies
2.1.2 Financial Contracts between Entrepreneurs and Foreign Lenders
As shown in subsection 2.3, entrepreneurs differ in their end-of-period wealth and are
indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Given r∗ < rt, entrepreneur i prefers to pledge his land stock kei,e
to foreign lenders for ze,∗i,t units of final goods before he turns to the mutual funds for
domestic loans. The entrepreneur’s collateral constraints are binding,
r∗ze,∗i,t = θ
k
tEtqt+1k
e
i,t. (1)
Due to costly state verification, the loan contract with a non-contingent repayment
is commonly assumed in the literature (Gale and Hellwig, 1985). In our model, the
information problem that gives rise to the financial frictions between the entrepreneur and
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the foreign lenders results partly from liquidation costs that are proportional to the ex post
land value. In this sense, it is more reasonable to consider state-contingent repayments
than non-contingent repayments. Since the entrepreneur and the foreign lenders are risk
neutral, the optimal financial contract should let them share the effects of unexpected
changes in the land price proportionally. In other words, the contract involves the split
of capital gains (losses) between the contracting parties. If the financial regulator does
not change θj, there will not be any capital gains (losses). Even if the financial regulator
changes θj, capital gains (losses) only occur at the date of announcement. Thus, the
difference in the repayment form does not change our results qualitatively.
In period t+1, the foreign lenders get θkt qt+1k
e
i,t units of final goods as repayment and
the land has a net value of (1 − θkt )qt+1kei,t to the entrepreneur. For foreign lenders, the
ex post rate of return on the entrepreneur’s land-backed foreign borrowing is
re,∗t+1 = r
∗
[
1 +
qt+1 − Etqt+1
Etqt+1
]
. (2)
2.1.3 Financial Contracts between Households and Foreign Lenders
Given r∗ < rt, households prefer to borrow cheap foreign funds and deposit them at the
mutual funds to take advantage of the interest rate differential. They borrow zh,∗t units
of final goods abroad against their land stock kt and borrow z
d,∗
t units of final goods
abroad against their deposits dt in period t. Their collateral constraints are binding in
equilibrium,
r∗zh,∗t = θ
k
tEtqt+1kt, (3)
r∗zd,∗t = θ
d
t rtdt. (4)
As households are risk averse and foreign lenders are risk neutral, the optimal financial
contract should perfectly insure the households against unexpected changes in the land
price and the deposit returns. Foreign lenders get qt+1kt − (1− θkt )Etqt+1kt as repayment
on the household land-backed foreign borrowing and the land has a safe net value of
(1 − θkt )Etqt+1kt to households in period t + 1. For foreign lenders, the ex post rate of
return on the household land-backed foreign borrowing is
rh,∗t+1 = r
∗
(
1 +
qt+1 − Etqt+1
θktEtqt+1
)
. (5)
Similarly, foreign lenders get r˜t+1dt− (1− θdt )rtdt as repayment on the household deposit-
backed foreign borrowing and the deposits have a safe net value of (1− θdt )rtdt for house-
holds in period t + 1, where r˜t is the ex post rate of return on mutual funds in period t.
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By definition, rt = Etr˜t+1. For foreign lenders, the ex post rate of return on the household
deposit-backed foreign borrowing is
rd,∗t+1 = r
∗
(
1 +
r˜t+1 − rt
θdt rt
)
. (6)
2.2 Households
Households have identical preferences over consumption and leisure,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
c1−σt
1− σ + χ
(1− lt)1+ψ
1 + ψ
]
,
where β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the time discount factor. ct and lt denote household consumption
and labor supply in period t, respectively.
Given that kt−1 units of land were invested in the household’s project in period t −
1, G(kt−1) units of intermediate goods are produced at the beginning of period t and
household sales revenues amount to vtG(kt−1).
Assumption 1. The household’s project is decreasing-return-to-scale, G′(k) > 0 and
G′′(k) < 0.
Given that households borrowed zh,∗t−1 abroad against their land stock kt−1 in period
t− 1, the land stock has a safe net value of (1− θkt−1)Et−1qtkt−1 to households in period
t. Given that households deposited dt−1 at the mutual funds and borrowed z
d,∗
t−1 against
the expected deposit returns in period t − 1, the deposits have a safe net value of (1 −
θdt−1)rt−1dt−1 to households in period t. The households’ wage income is wtlt. At the end
of period t, households consume ct, invest kt units of land, deposit dt, borrow z
h,∗
t and
zd,∗t abroad against their land and deposits, respectively.
According to equation (3), households can borrow
θkt Etqt+1
r∗ units of final goods abroad
against each unit of land invested in period t. The household unit down payment is defined
as the amount of own funds they pay for a unit of land, ut = qt − θ
k
t Etqt+1
r∗ . According to
equation (4), households can borrow
θdt rt
r∗ units of final goods abroad against each unit of
domestic deposit in period t. Thus, the households’ net deposits amount to
(
1− θdt rt
r∗
)
dt.
The households’ flow-budget constraints are,(
qt − θ
k
tEtqt+1
r∗
)
kt + ct +
(
1− θ
d
t rt
r∗
)
dt =(1− θkt−1)Et−1qtkt−1 + vtG(kt−1)
+ (1− θdt−1)rt−1dt−1 + wtlt.
(7)
Optimization over {ct, lt, dt, kt} gives the equilibrium conditions,
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wt = χ(1− lt)ψcσt , (8)(
1
rt
− θ
d
t
r∗
)
= β(1− θdt )Et
(
ct+1
ct
)−σ
, (9)
qt − θ
k
tEtqt+1
r∗
= βEt[(1− θkt )qt+1 + vt+1G′(kt)]
(
ct+1
ct
)−σ
. (10)
2.3 Entrepreneurs
Each entrepreneur can choose one of the two projects: “Good” or “Bad”, at the end of
each period and his project choice is irreversible. Both projects have the same Leontief
technology, i.e., a units of final goods are required for each unit of land invested.3 At
the beginning of the next period, the project produces R units of intermediate goods per
unit of land invested if it succeeds; there is no output if it fails. The two projects provide
the entrepreneur with safe, non-pecuniary private benefits4 during the project process.
For convenience of aggregation, we assume that private benefits are proportional to the
amount of land invested. Project “Good” (“Bad”) has a probability of success pG (pB)
and provides entrepreneurs with private benefits bG (bB) per unit of land invested, where
0 < pB < pG < 1 and bB > bG > 0. In other words, project “Good” is safer than projects
“Bad”, but entrepreneurs get larger unit private benefits from project “Bad”.
As shown below, entrepreneurs differ in their end-of-period wealth and are indexed by
i ∈ [0, 1]. The expected utility function of entrepreneur i is,
E0
T˜∑
t=0
βt
[
cei,t + Bkei,t−1
]
,
where T˜ is the stochastic time of death and B ∈ {bG, bB} denotes private benefits per
unit of land invested in project “Good” or project “Bad”. cei,t denotes his consumption
in period t and kei,t−1 denotes his land stock invested in period t− 1.
3In models with collateral constraints a` la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the leverage ratio of borrowers,
defined as the ratio of total investment over own funds, is equal to the inverse of the gross interest rate,
which is too high and cannot be justified by the empirical data. We introduce the input of final goods to
reduce the leverage ratio of entrepreneurs to the reasonable level, e.g., two.
4Our set-up resembles the principal-agent setting in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997, 1998). According
to Hart (1995), private benefits may refer to any nonpecuniary benefits from running a project, e.g.,
large offices or luxury business cars. Private benefits are good for the project owners but may reduce the
success probability of projects. The trade-off between the success probability and private benefits is a
short-cut to capture the divergent objectives between the project owners and the outside financiers.
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Our calibration guarantees that only project “Good” has a positive expected net
present value around the steady state,
Et
[
pGRvt+1 + (1− θkt )qt+1
rt
+
θkt qt+1
r∗
]
> qt + a > Et
[
pBRvt+1 + (1− θkt )qt+1
rt
+
θkt qt+1
r∗
]
.
Therefore, project “Bad” should not be financed in equilibrium. In addition, our calibra-
tion guarantees that the expected rate of return on project “Good” exceeds that of the
households’ project even in the case of kt = 0,
Et
[
pGRvt+1+(1−θkt )qt+1
rt
+
θkt qt+1
r∗
]
qt + a
>
Et
[
vt+1G′(0)+(1−θkt )qt+1
rt
+
θkt qt+1
r∗
]
qt
.
Thus, if the project choice of entrepreneurs were perfectly observable, entrepreneurs could
borrow against all outcomes of project “Good” and all land would be allocated to them.
At the end of period t, the entrepreneur invests kei,t units of land and ak
e
i,t units
of final goods into either project “Good” or project “Bad”, using his own funds, ni,t,
foreign loans, ze,∗i,t , and domestic loans, z
m
i,t. Thus, ni,t = (qt + a)k
e
i,t − (ze,∗i,t + zmi,t) is the
entrepreneur’s net worth in the project. The land-backed foreign borrowing contract has
been specified in subsection 2.1.2. As the mutual funds cannot observe the project choice
of the entrepreneur, the domestic loan contract resembles the standard loan contract
(Gale and Hellwig, 1985) and specifies a promise to repay Rmt k
e
i,t units of final goods
in period t + 1 if the project succeeds. As the mutual funds can perfectly verify the
project output, the entrepreneur always repays the promised amount if he is able to do
so. If the project fails, the entrepreneur hands over his land stock to mutual funds. After
repaying the amount owed by the entrepreneur to foreign lenders, mutual funds keep the
rest (1− θkt )qt+1kei,t. In order to motivate the entrepreneur to choose project “Good”, the
mutual funds must provide him with enough incentives,{
pGEt[Rvt+1 + (1− θkt )qt+1 −Rmt ] + bG
}
kei,t ≥
{
pBEt[Rvt+1 + (1− θkt )qt+1 −Rmt ] + bB
}
kei,t.
The left (right) hand side denotes the expected utility of the entrepreneur if he chooses
project “Good” (“Bad”). As the expected rate of return on project “Good” exceeds the
domestic interest rate, the entrepreneur prefers to borrow to the limit. The incentive
constraints are binding around the steady state and can be simplified to,
Rmt = Et[Rvt+1 + (1− θkt )qt+1]− b˜, where b˜ ≡
bB − bG
pG − pB > 0. (11)
Each unit of land invested in project “Good” in period t has an expected value of
Et(p
GRvt+1 + qt+1) in period t + 1, in which θ
k
tEtqt+1 is pledged to foreign lenders first.
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Any promise to repay more than Rmt k
e
t to the mutual funds in the case of success would
violate the incentive constraints and is not credible. Thus, the entrepreneur can only
pledge pGRmt + (1 − pG)(1 − θkt )Etqt+1 per unit of land invested to the mutual funds in
period t. Et(p
GRvt+1+qt+1) and p
G(Rmt +θ
k
tEtqt+1)+(1−pG)Etqt+1 are the expected full
unit value and external unit value of the land invested in project “Good”, respectively.
The difference between the two values, pGb˜, is used to motivate the entrepreneur to choose
project “Good” despite the lower private benefits it promises, bG < bB.
The mutual funds are expected to break even in period t, rtz
m
i,t = [p
GRmt +(1−pG)(1−
θkt )Etqt+1]k
e
i,t. This implies a credit constraint for entrepreneur i,
zmi,t = Γtni,t, where Γt ≡
pG(REtvt+1−b˜)+(1−θkt )Etqt+1
rt
(qt + a)− θ
k
t Etqt+1
r∗ − p
G(REtvt+1−b˜)+(1−θkt )Etqt+1
rt
.
Γt is the domestic credit multiplier. As we are interested in the case where entrepreneurs
finance their projects using both own funds and external funds, our calibration guarantees
that the denominator in the definition of Γt is positive around the steady state; otherwise,
entrepreneurs can finance their projects using external funds only. As Γt is independent
of ni,t, domestic loans are proportional to the entrepreneur’s net worth.
Suppose that entrepreneurs financed their project investment using foreign and do-
mestic loans in period t− 1. At the beginning of period t, entrepreneurs of mass pG have
successful projects and entrepreneurs of mass (1 − pG) have failed projects. After the
project completion, entrepreneurs of mass pi ∈ (0, 1) receive a signal of survival and the
rest have to exit from the economy.
Entrepreneurs who have successful projects and receive the signal of death are of mass
pG(1−pi). They repay their liabilities, sell off their assets, consume all proceeds, and exit
from the economy. Entrepreneurs who have failed projects and receive the signal of death
are of mass (1 − pG)(1 − pi). They hand over their land stock to the mutual funds and
exit from the economy without consumption.
The newcomers and the surviving entrepreneurs are endowed with a unit of labor and
in equilibrium, they supply their labor endowment inelastically let = 1 to the production
of final goods and their wage income is wet . At the end of period t, the entrepreneur max-
imizes his expected utility function, subject to his foreign borrowing constraints specified
in equation (1), his period-budget constraints, and domestic credit constraints,
(qt + a)k
e
i,t = ni,t + z
m
i,t + z
e,∗
i,t where ni,t ≡ Ni,t − cei,t,
zmi,t = Γtni,t,
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where Ni,t denotes his end-of-period wealth. The newcomers and entrepreneurs who
have failed projects and survive to the next period are of mass (1 − pi) + (1 − pG)pi
and their end-of-period wealth is Ni,t = wet ; entrepreneurs who have successful projects
and survive to the next period are of mass pGpi and their end-of-period wealth is Ni,t =
wet + [Rvt + (1− θkt−1)qt − Rmt−1]kei,t−1. As the marginal rate of return on project “Good”
exceeds the foreign and domestic interest rates, entrepreneurs invest all wealth, borrow
to the limit, and postpone consumption to the period of death. It also justifies the fact
that the newcomers and the surviving entrepreneurs supply all of their labor endowment.
Due to linear technologies and preferences, the foreign loans, domestic loans, and
project investment of entrepreneur i are proportional to his net worth. As a result, only
the first moment of the distribution of entrepreneurial net worth matters for the aggregate
land stock in the entrepreneur sector. Let lower-case letters without the index i denote
per capita variables of entrepreneurs. Per capita consumption cet , net worth nt, domestic
loans zmt , foreign borrowing, z
e,∗
t , and land holding k
e
t of entrepreneurs are
cet = (1− pi)pG[Rvt + (1− θkt−1)qt −Rmt−1]ket−1, (12)
nt = pip
G[Rvt + (1− θkt−1)qt −Rmt−1]ket−1 + wet , (13)
zmt =
[pG(REtvt+1 − b˜) + (1− θkt )Etqt+1]ket
rt
, (14)
ze,∗t =
θktEtqt+1k
e
t
r∗
, (15)
ket =
nt + z
e,∗
t + z
m
t
qt + a
. (16)
We introduce three auxiliary variables. The first is the entrepreneur unit down pay-
ment, defined as the amount of own funds the entrepreneur pays for a unit of land and
the required input of final goods, uet =
ni,t
kei,t
= (qt+ a)− θ
k
t Etqt+1
r∗ − p
G(REtvt+1−b˜)+(1−θkt )Etqt+1
rt
.
The second is the leverage ratio, defined as the ratio of total investment over the en-
trepreneur’s net worth, Ωt ≡ (qt+a)k
e
i,t
ni,t
= qt+a
uet
. The third is the profitability of project
“Good”, defined as the expected gross rate of return on the entrepreneur’s net worth,
ξt ≡ p
GEt[Rvt+1+(1−θkt )qt+1−Rmt ]kei,t
ni,t
= p
Gb˜
uet
. The three auxiliary variables are independent of
the entrepreneurs’ net worth. Our calibration guarantees that the profitability of project
“Good” exceeds the domestic interest rate around the steady state, ξt > rt. Thus, en-
trepreneurs supply all labor endowment, invest all own funds into their projects, borrow
to the limit, and postpone consumption to the period of death.
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2.4 Mutual Funds
LetKet−1 and Zt−1 denote the aggregate land stock and domestic borrowing of entrepreneurs
at the end of period t− 1, respectively. The aggregate expected break-even condition of
the mutual funds in period t−1 is rt−1Zt−1 = [pGRmt−1+(1−pG)(1−θkt−1)Et−1qt]Ket−1. At
the beginning of period t, the total repayment of entrepreneurs with successful projects is
pGRmt−1K
e
t−1; entrepreneurs with failed projects hand over their land stock (1 − pG)Ket−1
to the mutual funds. After repaying (1−pG)θkt−1qtKet−1 to the foreign lenders, the mutual
funds keep the rest, (1− pG)(1− θkt−1)qtKet−1.
The loan contract described in subsection 2.3 implicitly provides entrepreneurs with a
net unit return, with a positive expected value, pGb˜ > 0, in period t− 1. For a successful
entrepreneur, the post-repayment return on a unit of land in period t is
Rvt + (1− θkt−1)qt −Rmt−1 = b˜+R(vt − Et−1vt) + (1− θkt−1)(qt − Et−1qt).
A policy change results in unexpected changes in the prices of land and intermediate
goods in period t, qt 6= Et−1qt and vt 6= Et−1vt . The expected net return to entrepreneurs,
pGb˜Ket−1, absorbs most aggregate risk and the ex post rate of return on mutual funds,
r˜t =
[pGRmt−1 + (1− pG)(1− θkt−1)qt]Ket−1
Zt−1
= rt−1
{
1 +
(1− pG)(1− θkt−1)(qt − Et−1qt)
Et−1[pG(Rvt − b˜) + (1− θkt−1)qt]
}
,
(17)
differs from its expected value rt−1 ≡ Et−1r˜t due to unexpected changes in the price of
land. According to our calibration, 1 − pG = 0.01, the ex post rate of return on mutual
funds and deposits does not differ much from its expected value. Furthermore, as the
foreign lenders also bear a fraction of capital gains or losses on the land stock of failed
entrepreneurs, the discrepancy between the ex post rate of return on deposits and its
expected value decreases in θk.
2.5 Final Goods Production and the Balance of Payment
Final goods are produced from intermediate goods and labor in a Cobb-Douglas fashion,
Yt =M
α
t L
(1−α−α′)
t (L
e
t)
α′ , (18)
where Mt, Lt, and L
e
t denote aggregate inputs of intermediate goods, household labor,
and entrepreneur labor.5 The inputs are priced by their marginal products,
5As households and entrepreneurs are each of unit mass, the values of aggregate variables coincide
with their per capita values.
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vtMt = αYt, (19)
wtLt = (1− α− α′)Yt, (20)
wetL
e
t = α
′Yt. (21)
The aggregate foreign borrowing, Z∗t = z
e,∗
t + z
h,∗
t + z
d,∗
t , is backed by domestic assets,
r∗Z∗t = θ
k
tEtqt+1K + θ
d
t rtdt, (22)
and net exports NXt covers the net interest payment on foreign borrowing,
NXt + Z
∗
t = r
e,∗
t z
e,∗
t−1 + r
h,∗
t z
h,∗
t−1 + r
d,∗
t z
d,∗
t−1. (23)
Assumption 2. lims→∞Et(βsqt+s) = 0.
Assumption 2 rules out explosive bubbles in the land price. Without explosive bubbles
in the land price, the foreign borrowing backed by land is sustainable and the economy
does not run into the problem of Ponzi games.
2.6 Market Equilibrium
The markets of intermediate goods, final goods, land, labor, and domestic loans clear,
Mt = G(kt−1) + pGRket−1, (24)
Yt = ct + c
e
t + ak
e
t +NXt, (25)
K = kt + k
e
t , (26)
Let = l
e
t = 1, (27)
Lt = lt, (28)
zmt = dt. (29)
Definition 1. A market equilibrium is a set of allocations of households, {kt, lt, zh,∗t , zd,∗t , ct},
and entrepreneurs, {ket , let , nt, zmt , ze,∗t , cet}, along with aggregate variables {Mt, Yt, NXt, Z∗t }
and a set of prices {vt, qt, wt, wet , rt, r˜t, rh,∗t , rd,∗t , re,∗t , Rmt } satisfying equations (2)- (6), (8)-
(27), given the exogenous processes {θkt , θdt }.
If land-backed foreign borrowing is not allowed, the market equilibrium is almost same
as defined above by setting θk = 0. The only exception is that households have to bear
unexpected changes in the land price and their budget constraint are
qtkt + ct +
(
1− θ
d
t rt
r∗
)
dt = qtkt−1 + vtG′(kt−1) + (1− θdt−1)rt−1dt−1 + wtlt. (30)
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If deposit-backed foreign borrowing is not allowed, the market equilibrium is almost same
as defined above by setting θd = 0. The only exception is that households have to bear
unexpected changes in the deposit return and their budget constraints are
utkt + ct + dt = (1− θt−1)Et−1qtkt−1 + vtG′(kt−1) + r˜tdt−1 + wtlt. (31)
2.7 Calibration
As our paper intends to provide a conceptual framework to think about the implications
of financial liberalization in a small open economy, we focus here more on its qualitative
effects instead of its quantitative relevance. As an analytical solution is not obtainable, we
use a numerical example to show the intuition explicitly. We calibrate the model to fulfill
certain steady-state conditions in the case of international financial autarky (θk = θd = 0).
The households’ project takes the following functional form,
G(kt) =
K
1 + λ
[
1−
(
1− kt
K
)1+λ]
, (32)
and the marginal product, G′(kt) = K
(
1− kt
K
)λ
, is decreasing in the households’ land
holding, where λ = 8. We set β = 0.98 and r¯∗ = 1.01 so that the annual domestic and
foreign interest rates are 8% and 4% in the steady state, respectively. Households have
log utility in consumption, σ = 1, as used in Kiyotaki and Moore (2005). Since we want
to emphasize the efficiency gains due to the land reallocation between households and
entrepreneurs, we keep household labor supply relatively inelastic, ψ = −5, so as to limit
the effect of household labor on aggregate output of final goods. We set χ = 0.39 so
that households work eight hours a day in the production of final goods, l = 1
3
. We set
α = 0.36 and α′ = 0.00001 so that the households’ wage income accounts for nearly 64%
of aggregate output of final goods and the entrepreneur wage income is negligible.
The aggregate land stock is normalized at unity, K = 1. The surviving probability of
entrepreneurs is set at pi = 2
3
, implying that one-third of entrepreneurs have to exit from
the economy each period. {R = 655, b˜ = 1.92,  = 60, a = 1.53} are calibrated jointly to
satisfy the following conditions in the steady state: the land price is q = 1; the land stock
of entrepreneurs is three times as much as that of households, k
e
K
= 0.75; the leverage
ratio, Ω = 2, implies that entrepreneurs finance half of the their project investments
using own funds, as in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999).
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3 The Long-Run Effects of Financial Liberalization
3.1 Deregulating Deposit-Backed Foreign Borrowing
Figure 2 shows the steady state values of some variables in the model economy against
θd, given θk ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}, respectively. The horizontal axis denotes θd ∈ [0, 1]. Agg, FG,
EN, and HH refer to aggregate, final goods, entrepreneurs, and households, respectively.
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Figure 2: Deregulating Deposit-Backed Foreign Borrowing
Consider the case in which land-backed foreign borrowing is not allowed, θk = 0,
see the dotted line. Entrepreneurs can only borrow from the mutual funds and their
external funds, zm = d, consist of the households’ net deposits, d− zd,∗ = (1− θdr
r∗ )d, and
deposit-backed foreign funds, zd,∗ = θ
dr
r∗ d. According to equation (9), the rate of return
on the households’ net deposits is 1−θ
d
1
r
− θd
r∗
= 1
β
, independent of θd. The rise in θd actually
enables households to substitute cheap foreign funds for their net deposits. In the case of
θd = 1, households fully pledge their deposits to the foreign lenders and domestic loans
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to entrepreneurs are essentially provided by the foreign lenders only.
As θd rises from 0 to 1, the domestic interest rate, r = 1
β+θd( 1r∗−β)
, declines from 1
β
to r∗. Intuitively, the increase in the inflow of cheap foreign funds reduces the average
cost of loanable funds in the domestic economy. Given θk = 0, entrepreneurs cannot
borrow directly abroad. However, the decline in the domestic interest rate due to the
rise in θd enables entrepreneurs to increase their domestic borrowing and expand their
project investment. In this sense, households act as financial intermediaries to channel
cheap foreign funds into the domestic economy. Given the fixed aggregate land stock,
the rise in the entrepreneurs’ demand pushes up the land price. Thus, the entrepreneurs’
leverage ratio rises and so does their land holding. As project “Good” is more productive
than the households’ project, aggregate output of intermediate goods rises. In this sense,
deregulating deposit-backed foreign borrowing improves production efficiency.
The rise in θd has three negative effects on household wealth: the return on the house-
holds’ net deposit (1−θd)rd declines in θd and so do their land stock and sales revenues of
intermediate goods. According to equation (30), the negative wealth effects induce house-
holds to increase their labor and reduce consumption. Thus, households lose strictly from
deregulating deposit-backed foreign borrowing. While, the entrepreneurs’ consumption,
which is proportional to their land holding, increases in θd. Thus, entrepreneurs bene-
fit strictly from deregulating deposit-backed foreign borrowing. Similar patterns can be
found in the cases of θk = 0.5 and θk = 1.
3.2 Deregulating Land-Backed Foreign Borrowing
Figure 2 shows the steady state values of some endogenous variables in the model economy
against θk, given θd ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}, respectively. The horizontal axis denotes θk ∈ [0, 1].
Consider first the case in which deposit-backed foreign borrowing is not allowed, θd =
0, see the dotted line. The domestic interest rate is above the foreign interest rate,
r = 1
β
> r∗. The rise in θk from 0 to 1 enables domestic agents to borrow more abroad
against their land stock. Thus, their demand for land rises and so does the land price.
As a larger share of entrepreneurs’ external funds is provided directly by the foreign
lenders at a rate lower than the domestic rate, the average cost of entrepreneurs’ external
funds declines significantly in θk. As a result, the land holding of entrepreneurs rises and
so does aggregate output of intermediate goods. In this case, deregulating land-backed
foreign borrowing improves production efficiency and has opposite welfare implications to
households and entrepreneurs, as discussed in subsection 3.1
Consider now the case in which domestic deposits can be fully pledged to the foreign
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Figure 3: Deregulating Land-Backed Foreign Borrowing
lenders, θd = 1, see the dash-dot line. The domestic interest rate is equal to the foreign
rate, r = r∗, and households actually make zero net deposits. In the case of θk = 0,
although entrepreneurs cannot borrow directly abroad, all of their domestic loans are
effectively provided by the foreign lenders via the household deposit-backed borrowing.
As θk rises from 0 to 1, the cost of the entrepreneurs’ external funds is constant at r∗,
while households can acquire cheap foreign funds against their land holding. The rise
in the households’ demand for land pushes up the land price and entrepreneurs have to
reduce their land stock. In this case, production becomes less efficient.
The net value of the households’ land stock (1 − θk)qk declines in θk. Due to the
negative wealth effect, households have to increase labor and reduce consumption. The
unfavorable land reallocation has negative welfare effects on entrepreneurs, too. Therefore,
both households and entrepreneurs lose strictly in the long run.
In sum, as financial liberalization is a two-dimensional issue in our model, the so-
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phisticated interaction between its two components, i.e., land-backed and deposit-backed
foreign borrowing, complicates its implications to production efficiency and social wel-
fare. Although deregulating land-backed foreign borrowing reduces the average cost of
external funds of entrepreneurs, it also reduces the household unit down payment of land.
Whether deregulating land-backed foreign borrowing can improve production efficiency
actually depends on the relative changes in the cost of external funds of entrepreneurs and
households. If deposit-backed foreign borrowing is highly regulated, the domestic interest
rate is still quite high. As θk rises from 0 to 1, the average cost of the entrepreneurs’
external funds declines in a larger magnitude than the cost of the households’ external
funds. However, if deposit-backed foreign borrowing is highly deregulated, the domestic
interest rate is already very low. As θk rises from 0 to 1, the average cost of entrepreneurs’
external funds declines in a smaller magnitude than the cost of the households’ external
funds. In contrast, deregulating deposit-backed foreign borrowing has the negative effect
on the domestic interest rate, which facilitates the land reallocation towards the more
productive agents (entrepreneurs). Thus, if the financial regulator aims at improving pro-
duction efficiency in the domestic economy, it should deregulate deposit-backed foreign
borrowing rather than land-backed foreign borrowing.
4 The Implementation of Financial Liberalization
This section discusses how a big-bang and a gradualism strategy can result in macroe-
conomic fluctuations. Subsection 4.1 compares the dynamics of the model economy to
the two strategies of raising θd permanently from 50% to 55%, given that the economy
is at its old steady state θd = 50% before period 0 and land-backed foreign borrowing
is not allowed θk = 0. Subsection 4.2 compares the dynamics of the model economy to
the two strategies of raising θk from 50% to 55%, given that the economy is at its old
steady state θk = 50% before period 0 and deposit-backed foreign borrowing is not allowed
θd = 0. The endogenous variables are approximated as the linear functions of the state
variables in logarithms around the old steady state, which we solve using the MATLAB
codes provided by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004).6
6Section 3 shows that a permanent change in θj changes the steady state of the economy. Thus, the
dynamic analysis based on the log-linearization at the old steady state could be inaccurate. However, for
a small change in θj , e.g, 10% here, we can still use first-order approximations to analyze the transitional
dynamics from the old steady state to the new steady state.
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4.1 Deregulating Deposit-Backed Foreign Borrowing
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses of the model economy to the big-bang strategy
(dashed line) and the gradualism strategy (solid line) of raising θd permanently from 50%
to 55%, given θk = 0.
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Figure 4: Deregulating Deposit-Backed Foreign Borrowing: Big-Bang vs. Gradualism
Consider the big-bang strategy first. The financial regulator raises θd from 50% to
55% permanently from period 0 on. Households can immediately borrow abroad against
a larger fraction of their deposits and, thus deposit-backed foreign borrowing rises dramat-
ically in period 0. The supply effect dominates in the domestic credit market in the sense
that the domestic interest rate declines contemporaneously. In the meantime, anticipating
a higher land price in the new steady state, domestic agents increase their land demand.
Thus, the land price rises in period 0 and the capital gains improve entrepreneurial net
worth and household wealth.
The rise in entrepreneurial net worth and the decline in the domestic interest rate
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jointly amplify the entrepreneurs’ demand for land and the land price rises to clear the
market. These mutual reinforcing interactions between prices and quantities are an in-
herent feature of models with financial frictions. The land price overshoots in the sense
that it rises by 1.6% in period 0, much larger than the 0.4% in the new steady state.7
The positive wealth effect and the decline in the domestic interest rate induces house-
holds to increase consumption and reduce net deposits at the mutual funds in period 0.
Anticipating a lower consumption in the new steady state, households prefer to smooth
consumption by reducing their net deposits only by 8.5%, smaller than the 9.7% in the
new steady state. As deposit-backed foreign borrowing rises to its new steady state value,
aggregate deposits at the mutual funds rise by 0.98%, larger than the 0.38% in the new
steady state. Thus, the excess supply of domestic loans reduces the domestic interest rate
by 0.63%, larger than the 0.05% in the new steady state. The positive wealth effect also
induces households to reduce labor and aggregate output of final goods declines in period
0. As θd is constant at its new steady state value from period 0 on, the land price and
the domestic interest rate converge fast to their respective new steady state values and
so do household consumption and labor supply.
As shown in figure 2, households strictly lose from deregulating deposit-backed for-
eign borrowing in the long run. Since the domestic interest rate are lower in the new
steady state than in the old one, households consume their extra net deposits and their
period utility actually rises in period 0. In this sense, the overall implications of dereg-
ulating deposit-backed foreign borrowing to household welfare should be evaluated with
the consideration of both short-run and long-run effects.
Consider now the gradualism strategy. The financial regulator announces the future
policy path of θdt in period 0, see figure 1. Anticipating a higher land price in the future,
domestic agents increase their demand for land in period 0. Thus, the land price rises
in period 0 and the capital gains improve the household wealth and entrepreneurial net
worth. As θd0 = 50% is still at its old steady state value in period 0, deposit-backed foreign
borrowing does not increase dramatically in period 0. Therefore, the demand effect domi-
nates in the domestic credit market in the sense that the rise in the entrepreneurs’ demand
for domestic loans pushes up the domestic interest rate. Although capital gains improve
entrepreneurial net worth, the rise in the domestic interest rate curbs the entrepreneurs’
demand for domestic loans and land. As a result, the land price rises by 0.28% in period
0, smaller than the 0.4% in the new steady state. In other words, the land price does not
7This phenomenon is similar as the exchange rate overshooting (Dornbusch, 1976). The overshooting
of the land price here results from financial frictions instead of price rigidity.
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overshoot in period 0.
The rise in the domestic interest rate and capital gains have opposite effects on house-
holds’ decision on consumption and deposit. In equilibrium, households do not change
consumption and deposits much in period 0. Due to the consumption-leisure substitution,
households do not change their labor supply much in period 0, either. Thus, aggregate
output of final goods does not decline as much as in the case of the big-bang strategy.
From period 1 on, θd rises gradually to the new steady state value. Due to the increase
in deposit-backed foreign borrowing, the domestic interest rate is below the old steady
state value in period 1 and converges to the new steady state value from then on. Thus,
household consumption rises above the old steady state value in period 1 and converges
to the new steady state value that is lower than the old one. In the meantime, household
labor supply falls below the old steady state value in period 0 and converges to the new
steady state value that is above the old one. The opposite short-run and long-run welfare
implications to households are similar as in the case of the big-bang strategy.
The big-bang strategy and the gradualism strategy differ in their effects on the domes-
tic interest rate in period 0. The big-bang strategy allows the immediate increase in the
inflow of cheap foreign funds and the domestic interest rate declines. Given that capital
gains improve entrepreneurial net worth in period 0, the decline in the interest rate fur-
ther amplify the entrepreneurs’ demand for land and the land price overshoot in period 0.
In contrast, the gradualism strategy does not allow an immediate increase in the inflow
of cheap foreign funds and the domestic interest rate rises to curb the entrepreneurs’ de-
mand for domestic loans and land. Thus, the land price does not overshoot. As a result,
output, labor, consumption, and net exports respond in a much smaller magnitude to the
gradualism strategy than to the big-bang strategy.
4.2 Deregulating Land-Backed Foreign Borrowing
Figure 5 shows the impulse responses of the model economy to the big-bang strategy
(dashed line) and the gradualism strategy (solid line) of raising θk permanently from 50%
to 55%, given θd = 0.
Consider the big-bang strategy first. The financial regulator raises θk from 50% to
55% from period 0 on and domestic agents can borrow abroad against a larger fraction
of the value of their land holding. Thus, the rise in land-backed foreign borrowing pushes
up the land demand in period 0 and the land price rises to clear the market. According
to the land-backed financial contracts specified in subsection 2.1, entrepreneurs and the
foreign lenders equally share the capital gains on the entrepreneurs’ land stock, while the
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Figure 5: Deregulating Land-Backed Foreign Borrowing: Big-Bang vs. Gradualism
foreign lenders take all capital gains on the households’ land stock and the land stock has
a safe net value to households. The capital gains improve entrepreneurial net worth and
entrepreneurs increase their demand for land over-proportionally. The land price rises
further and the spiral process between the land price, entrepreneurial net worth, and the
entrepreneurs’ demand for land continues. Altogether, the land price rises by 4.1% and
the entrepreneurs’ land stock rises by 0.65% in period 0.
Given that domestic agents finance their land investment using more foreign funds, the
entrepreneurs’ demand for domestic loans declines in period 0 and so does the domestic
interest rate. Thus, households prefer to consume more and deposit less. Anticipating
a lower consumption in the new steady state, households prefer to smooth consumption
by reducing deposits by 3.76%, smaller than the 4.57% in the new steady state. The
consumption-leisure substitution induces households to reduce labor supply in period 0
and aggregate output of final goods declines.
The rise in the period-0 entrepreneurs’ land stock pushes up aggregate output of
25
intermediate goods in period 1. Given that household labor supply is very close to its
new steady state value since period 1, aggregate output of final goods exceeds its old steady
state value in period 1. Given no more policy shock from period 1 on, macroeconomic
aggregates converge to their respective steady state values. Thus, household period utility
exceeds its old steady state value in period 0 and converges to its new steady state value.
Consider now the gradualism strategy. The financial regulator announces the future
policy path for θkt in period 0. Anticipating a higher land price in the future, domestic
agents increase their demand for land in period 0 and the land price rises to clear the
market. Capital gains improve entrepreneurial net worth and entrepreneurs increase their
demand for external funds and land. As θk0 = 50%, entrepreneurs cannot increase their
land-backed foreign borrowing dramatically and they increase their demand for domestic
loans. Thus, the domestic interest rate rises in period 0. Households reduces consumption
and increase labor supply in order to deposit more at the mutual funds for the favorable
interest rate. The rise in household labor pushes up aggregate output of final goods in
period 0.
As the entrepreneurs can borrow abroad against an increasingly larger fraction of
their land value from period 1 on, their demand for domestic loans declines and so does
the domestic interest rate. Anticipating a lower consumption in the new steady state,
households prefer to smooth consumption by further increasing their deposits despite a
lower domestic interest rate in period 1. The increase in the entrepreneurs’ land stock in
period 0 leads to the rise in aggregate output of intermediate goods in period 1. Thus,
aggregate output of final goods is still above its steady state value in period 1 despite the
decline in household labor supply. From period 1 on, macroeconomic aggregates converge
to their respective new steady state values.
During the process of the rise in θk, entrepreneurs substitute land-backed foreign bor-
rowing for domestic loans and, thus households have to reduce their deposits eventually.
In other words, the rise in household period utility in the first few periods actually results
from the spending of these deposits.
Similarly as in subsection 4.1, macroeconomic aggregates respond to the gradualism
strategy in a smaller magnitude than to the big-bang strategy in the case of deregulating
land-backed foreign borrowing.
26
5 Final Remarks
This paper provides a framework for analyzing the macroeconomic implications of financial
liberalization in a small, open, real economy. Whether or not deregulating one sector
can improve production efficiency depends on the financial regulation of other sectors.
Furthermore, the improvement in production efficiency does not necessarily imply a higher
welfare for domestic agents. Due to the direct or indirect substitution of foreign loans
for domestic loans, domestic lenders strictly suffer from the negative wealth effect in the
long run; while domestic borrowers might be able to acquire more domestic productive
assets and benefit from financial liberalization in the long run. In this sense, financial
liberalization may have opposite long-run welfare implications to domestic agents with
different productivity and aggregate output is not a good indicator for social welfare in
the model with heterogeneous agents. However, the welfare of domestic lenders may rise
during the transition, because the funds which are substituted by foreign loans are used to
finance additional consumption. Finally, due to financial frictions, asset prices overshoot
and macroeconomic fluctuations are large if financial liberalization is implemented hastily.
In contrast, if financial liberalization is implemented gradually, domestic agents have time
to adjust to the new policy and a smooth transition can be achieved.
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